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Summary 
 
In the last decades the consequences of the economic growth on the ecosystem are evident, 
and the environmental protection has become a crucial issue not only in natural sciences 
setting, but especially from an economic and political point of view. Researchers and 
policymakers focused the attention on the causes of pollution in order to prevent 
environmental degradation, and on the consequences that economic and political actions may 
have on the economic growth.  
This work, through three different essays, attempts to debate the environmental issue in a wide 
prospective from different points of view. The first one regards the link between international 
trade and environment. In some cases, researchers agreed with the idea that trade liberalization 
could lead to an improvement of environmental quality, while Pollution Haven Hypothesis 
states that environmental regulation induces firms to relocate dirty production where the 
environmental regulation is less stringent. The first part of this work gives an overview of this 
branch of literature, explaining some studies that support and contrast these theories. 
The research question of the second part concerns the international flow of hazardous waste 
and its drivers. Using a gravity model for trade, the article tries to underlines the role played 
by the relative levels of policy stringency and the technological specialization across EU-
OECD countries and regions. 
The last part of the present work, tries to analyse the eco-friendly innovation from a different 
point of view. Considering a long span of time, the essay investigates the effects that income 
distribution and institutions may have on the generation of environmental related patents. 
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Trade liberalization and environment: a survey of the literature 
 
Abstract 
This article offers a review of the literature about the relationship between 
trade and environment. We tried to mark the rout of the literature about this 
topic focusing on the different factors involved. The topic is analysed from 
different perspectives through the empirical contributions of the literature 
about this debate, starting from the role played by regulation, until the 
implications about capital.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
The economic debate has dealt with many issues over time, perhaps one of the most heated has 
been the openness to international trade as a driver of growth and development. The basic idea 
is that market specialization leads to a more efficient allocation of resources exploiting the 
comparative advantage. Furthermore, this allows to a widespread availability of new 
technologies making more competitive domestic and international markets.  
In this setting the relationship between international trade and environmental quality appears 
significant. In some cases, the researchers agreed with the idea that trade liberalization could 
lead to an improvement of allocation in domestic market, for example the study conducted by 
Brack (1998) underlined the role of trade liberalization as a driver of a “green” specialization. 
On the other hand, several works tried to demonstrate the opposite result, underlining the 
negative role of trade liberalization in increasing environmental pollution. The global challenge 
is to solve the conflict between environmental degradation and economic growth due to 
international trade.  
An important branch of literature faced this issue from different points of view. Theoretical 
works have tried to investigate different links between trade openness and environmental 
quality, and at the same time many studies have tried to validate these results through empirical 
analysis that conduct to different conclusions in different environmental fields. Among these 
theories Pollution Haven Hypothesis, that represents the major research area, suggests that 
relatively poorer countries could become more polluted through trade. The theoretical 
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foundation of this idea rises from the assumption that the industry’s spread depends on the 
normative differences about regulation stringency.  
On the contrary an alternative theory considers the role of the factor endowment (Copeland and 
Taylor, 2004) underlining how dirty industries are relative capital-intensive, for this reason 
these production processes should be relocated to the relative capital-abundant developed 
countries. Empirical studies provided by Tobey (1990) and Jaffe et al. (1995), in fact, found that 
the international flows of dirtiest productions and goods are due to factor endowment 
motivations and not to different regulation systems. 
Another important strand of literature highlights the role played by income per capita. 
According to the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) (Grossman and Krueger, 1993) there is 
U-shaped relationship between a country’s per capita income and its level of environmental 
quality, this means that if we can consider the environmental quality as a normal good (it 
increases with the level of the income) than trade could have a strong impact on the environment 
since it generated wealth and growth. The basic idea is that income growth does not increase 
the level of environmental degradation, but rather higher levels of income lead to an 
improvement in environmental quality. This means that while environmental quality 
deteriorates in the early stages of economic development, it improves in the later stages. 
Corresponding to the early stage of economic growth, the awareness of environmental problems 
is low or negligible and environment friendly technologies are not available (Dinda, 2004). 
This aspect also underlines how in the debate between trade and environment, we cannot ignore 
considerations concerning the national characteristics of the countries involved, such as income, 
factors endowment and technological level. 
The aim of this paper is to set out what we know about environmental consequences of 
economic growth and trade liberalization. Starting from the role of environmental policies we 
tried to review the existing literature by examining the importance of regulation, capital 
abundance, FDI and the existence of the EKC through the study of most important 
environmental fields1. 
The paper is organized as follow, section 2 analyses the relationship between environmental 
regulation and trade, while section 3 considers the link between trade and development. section 
                                                          
1 As Water pollution, carbon leakage, etc. 
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4 gives some evidences about the role played by capital abundance, and finally section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. The fight between environmental regulation and trade 
The literature in the last decades highlighted the role played by public policies in environmental 
field capable of influencing the trade flows. According to this strand of literature, stringent 
levels of regulation would prompt firms to leave the country for less strict (and hence less 
expensive) regulatory regimes. This is called by literature the “Pollution Haven Hypothesis” 
and represents the main topic at the centre of the debate about trade liberalization and 
environmental quality. The Pollution Haven Hypothesis (from now on PHH) posits that 
jurisdictions with weak environmental regulations (often the poorest countries) attract polluting 
industries relocating from more regulating countries. The reason is intuitive: the regulation rises 
the costs of polluting–intensive productions reducing their comparative advantage in those 
goods2.  As we can see in the next sections there are some evidences that expanded trade may 
worsen environmental conditions. The odds that increased trade will have net negative 
environmental impacts rise if resources are mispriced (Anderson, 1998; Panayotou, 1993), in 
fact expanded trade can exacerbate pollution harms and natural resource management mistakes 
in the absence of appropriate environmental policies (Nordstrom and Vaughan, 1999) 
 
2.1 “Pollution Haven Hypothesis” and “Environmental dumping” 
According to Copeland and Taylor (2004) a rigorous difference has to be made examining the 
literature about PHH. The first one regards the intrinsic definition of PHH, they argued that 
when the stringent regulation affects the trade flows (i.e. the flow of “dirty” goods imported or 
exported) then we face the “pollution haven effect”. Alternatively, the “Pollution Haven 
Hypothesis” concerns the trade patterns and the stringent environmental regulation. In fact, 
PHH predicts that the trade liberalization reduces trade barriers, in this way “dirty” industries 
shift from countries with stringent environmental regulation to countries with lax environmental 
regulation. These two concepts are related, in fact the pollution haven effect is necessary 
                                                          
2 Following Brunnemeier and Levison (2004) the theoretical foundation of this idea that is the Heckscher-Ohlin 
model of international trade, which shows that countries tend to export goods whose production is based on local  
factors as production inputs. 
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condition for the existence of PHH: when PHH occurs necessarily there is a pollution haven 
effect3. 
Furthermore, Copeland and Taylor (2004) argued that it may be useful to make a difference 
between PHH and another important concept: the environmental dumping. According to the 
authors “environmental dumping refers to a situation where pollution regulation is less 
stringent than it would be in the absence of strategic interaction. Alternatively, it is a situation 
where equilibrium pollution levels in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium exceed those in the 
cooperative equilibrium”. 
The first contributions to the literature about the environmental dumping are given by Barrett 
(1994) and Rauscher (1991). They argued that environmental dumping refers to the strategic 
use of the policy and its first best levels, that can have negative welfare implication. Instead, 
according to the authors, PHH focuses on the difference between policy instruments across 
countries and how this affects trade flows, thus PHH nothing predicts about welfare levels. 
Elbers and Withagens (2004) presented a theoretical model in which governments know the 
impacts of their environmental decisions on world prices, industry location and labour market. 
The traditional view of the literature about environment and international trade considers the 
factors’ mobility as a key determinant of the relocation of productions across countries, because 
if factors are immobile the possibility to shift production processes abroad is limited by the 
availability of productive factors, this is true especially if we consider that the countries with 
lax regulation are the poorest ones. However, this is not the only issue related to productivity 
factors, because factors moving into the lax regulation regions may bring new technology or 
rise the host country’s national income. Furthermore, Elbers and Withagen (2004) showed that, 
factor mobility may in some cases induce governments to increase the environmental standards 
because skilled workers have a higher environmental awareness. Considering standard two-
sector model with a monopolistically competitive manufacturing sector with increasing returns 
and a perfectly competitive agricultural sector with constant returns, the authors found that in 
this context factor mobility can reduce the tendency to concentrate polluting activities in one 
country. Lax pollution regulation rises the return to skilled labour and works towards the 
agglomeration of manufacturing in one country, the concentration of industry also raises local 
pollution levels. Since skilled workers also care about environmental quality, the increased local 
pollution lowers the welfare of skilled workers and works against this concentration. Thus, even 
                                                          
3 Taylor (2006) highlighted the necessity to separating this two concepts. 
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if the concentration of manufacturing in one country is a potential equilibrium (under some 
parameter values), the likelihood of the concentration is lessened by the introduction of 
environmental concerns. Concluding they showed that altering the degree of factor mobility 
does not necessarily imply a negative situation increasing pollution haven effect. 
 
2.2. Environmental policies, trade flows and environmental quality: some empirical evidences 
Several studies focused the attention on the effect of a regulatory regime on production and 
pollution levels, especially on air and water pollution.  
Starting from 1992 Lucas, Wheerler and Hettige used the IPPS4 data to examine whether the 
toxic intensity of production changed with economic growth for 80 countries between 1960 and 
1980. Using a pooled cross-sectional model, they found that toxic intensity of output increased 
especially in closed economies while open economies shifted toward cleaner industries. One 
year later Birdsall and Wheeler (1993) arrived at similar result studying the change in toxic 
intensity in Latin America. Both works focused on income levels and openness economy 
ignoring the role of other factors, such as resource endowments. Furthermore, problems of 
omitted variables bias are possible because of cross-sectional pooled data5. 
Another branch of literature considered that international trade can endogenously affect 
environmental policy, underlining a reverse causality between them. For example, Bommer 
(1998) defined NAFTA as a free trade agreement that potentially improves environmental 
situation. Indeed, the endogeneity effect changes considerably the results. Levinson and Taylor 
(2003) enumerated many mechanisms by which trade can affect pollution abatement costs (from 
now on PAC), including terms of trade effects, unobserved heterogeneity and natural resource 
endowments, etc. They, studying a panel dataset through two stage least square model, found 
that endogeneity as a positive and significant role. Ederington and Minier (2003) evaluated the 
U.S. net imports from 1978 to 1992 estimating three-stage least square model, they showed that 
pollution abatement costs have a significant and positive effect on imports, even if results are 
sensitive to the instruments chosen. Ederington, Levinson, and Minier (2004) tried to estimate 
U.S. net imports by 4-digit SIC code over the same period of Ederington and Minier (2003) 
                                                          
4 The World Bank industrial pollution projection system (IPPS). 
5 According to Copeland and Taylor (2004) most of the literature belonging to the period before 1997 considering 
cross-sectional data is unable to account for unobserved heterogeneity, usually this literature assumes pollution 
as an exogeneous variable. 
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using year and industries fixed effects. In spite of different evaluation, they confirmed the 
results.  
2.3 The problem of externalities  
Perhaps, the most debated issue around the question regards negative externalities caused by 
the movement of pollutants6 that have some long-distance impacts, for this reason the need to 
control this effect makes necessary the introduction of punctual policy to internalize the 
negative externalities. In fact, uninternalized externalities not only lead to environmental 
degradation, but also threaten market failures that will diminish the efficiency of international 
economic exchanges, reduce gains from trade, and lower social welfare. Some mechanism for 
promoting collective action and for disciplining free riders is therefore required (Baumol and 
Oates, 1988).  
Same studies have demonstrated that other forces work harder. Dean (2002) carried out two-
least square analysis on the water pollution discharge growth in China using as control variables 
countries’ specific characteristics and policy measures. What Dean (2002) tried to demonstrate 
is an increase of water pollution in the case of free trade, but simultaneously this effect is 
mitigated by the income growth generated by trade, finally the total effect is positive at country 
level. This means that the gain from trade obtained in terms of economic growth is so great that 
it outweighs the loss of welfare caused by water pollution. 
The policy debate has focused the attention especially on the normative standards about the 
carbon dioxide emissions7. The logic that emerges from the literature regards the possibility of 
a unilateral policy introduced by countries that controls CO2. The presence of a carbon tax could 
shift the comparative advantage of energy intensive productions from the countries with 
stringent policy to the countries with a lax normative system, this phenomenon is called in the 
literature as “carbon leakage”. One of the most important channel through this mechanism 
works is the changing in relative price: the carbon tax increases the cost of production so the 
energy-intensive productions shift away toward countries where the energy consumption is not 
taxed, generating here an increase of total emissions. The result is a distortive effect in terms of 
                                                          
6 Air pollutants as sulfur dioxide and carbon dioxide, and water pollutants.  
7 The cap-and-trade scheme, denominated EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), started with a pilot phase from 
2005 to 2007, followed by a second trading period (2008–2012). The current debate concerns the new rules 
introduced in 2008 on the ETS third trading period (2013–2020). On the 2008 ETS reform (the so-called 20-20-
20 package), see http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/pdf/draft proposal e_ort sharing.pdf. On the sectors 
included in ETS see McKinsey (2006). 
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displacement of production processes from countries with abating policies to countries where 
no climate policies are in force (Antimiani et al., 2013). 
Carbon leakage is typically treated using computable general equilibrium models (CGE), that 
represent an ex ante analysis compering the emission increase in non-Kyoto countries to 
emission increase in Kyoto countries. In this setting the works provided by Felder and 
Rutherford (1993) and Bernstein et al., (1999) found a moderate leakage, in contrast Burniaux 
and Martins (2000), Babiker (2005) found a significant leakage8. In 2008 the Word Bank tried 
to conduct an ex post analysis employing a gravity model to test the effect of carbon taxes on 
bilateral goods flows, the findings showed the absence of the leakage. In contrast, Aichele and 
Felbermayr (2011) tried to estimate in a panel context a similar gravity model for the CO2 
content of trade between Kyoto e non-Kyoto countries, in this case the evidences suggest that 
the carbon imports are increase as well as the total intensity of the imports (see Table 1). 
 
 
  
                                                          
8 Note that CGE simulations differ because of different assumption or parametrization.  
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Authors Empirical study Results 
Dean (2002) Two-least square analysis on the water pollution discharge 
growth in China using as control variables countries’ specific 
characteristics and policy measures 
The level of water pollution increases but 
this effect is mitigated by the income 
growth generated through the trade  
Lucas, Wheerler and Hettige (1992) Pooled cross-sectional model analysing the correlation 
between toxic intensity of production and economic growth 
Toxic intensity of output increased 
especially in closed economies. Open 
economies shifted toward cleaner industries. 
Birdsall and Wheeler (1993) Correlation between toxic intensity of production in Latin 
America and economic growth 
Similar results provided by Lucas, Wheerler 
and Hettige (1992). Openness encourages 
cleaner industry. 
Mani and Wheeler (1998) Through graphical approach, the work considers the share of 
“dirty” goods produced in OECD, South America and Asia 
from 1960 to 1995. 
Decreasing number of polluting industries 
in OECD countries and increasing in Asia 
and South America 
Levinson and Taylor (2003) The work analyses panel dataset about U.S. net export in 
order to study how trade can affects other factors (i.e. terms 
of trade effects, unobserved heterogeneity, industry size, etc.) 
The work stresses the role of endogeneity 
Ederington and Minier (2003)  Evaluation about U.S. net imports from 1978 to 1992 Pollution abatement costs have a significant 
and positive effect on imports 
Ederington, Levinson, and Minier (2004) U.S. net imports by 4-digit SIC code over the period 1978-
1992 using fixed effects 
The work confirms the previous results by 
Ederington and Minier (2003) 
Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor (2001) The authors evaluate the model through fixed effects analysis 
on sulfur dioxide (SO2) concentration over the period 1971-
1996 in 40 different countries. 
The rise in trade generates a decrease in 
SO2 concentrations. 
Table 1 – Summary of the literature 
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Berman and Bui (2001) Effect of policy stringency on changes in employment in 
refineries in Los Angeles between 1979 and 1992. 
They find no evidence that regulations have 
a negative effect on employment. 
Word Bank (2008) Ex post analysis through gravity model for trade to test the 
effect of carbon taxes on bilateral goods flow 
Absence of carbon leakage 
Aichele and Felbermayr (2011) Ex post analysis using gravity model CO2 content of trade The results suggest the presence of carbon 
leakage 
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3. Trade, environment and development 
3.1 Foreign directed investment and environmental consequences 
The standard approach to FDI inflows to developing countries is based on endogenous growth 
theory where FDI increases the capital stock and technological know-how, which in turn rises 
income and labor productivity in the host country, this could result in higher GDP and tax 
revenues. There is an important branch of literature that links the environmental pollution and 
the foreign directed investment. Foreign direct investment (FDI) has played an important role 
in promoting economic growth, especially in developing countries, which have reduced barriers 
to FDI and improved their business climates to attract FDI. In fact, according to Harrison (1994) 
foreign direct investment is an important source of advanced technology in developing nations, 
but although FDI helps economic development, they may lead to more environmental damage. 
In this setting two different hypothesis are opposed each other. According to the pollution haven 
hypothesis, weak environmental regulation in a host country may attract inward FDI by profit-
driven companies that want to avoid the compliance costs due to regulation (Jensen, 1996). On 
the other hand, FDI should have positive environmental spillovers very similar to its positive 
productivity spillovers. These positive externalities are largely due to the fact that FDI has the 
potential of transferring superior technologies from more developed to less developed 
economies. This hypothesis is called the FDI “halo effect”. Several studies consider the role of 
FDI taking different positions.  
3.1 FDI flows are influenced by environmental policy 
In 1997 Eskeland and Harrison conducted an empirical analysis that connected the U.S. 
pollution abatement costs to the FDI flows. They showed the absence of a significant effect in 
U.S. on both outbound and inbound FDI. This means they found no significant correlation 
between environmental regulation in industrialized countries and foreign investment in 
developing countries. This result seems to reject the role of FDI as a way to avoid the high 
compliance costs due to the regulation. 
On the contrary, some years later Smarzynska and Wei (2001) tried to estimate the role of 
inbound FDI in transition economies using the U.S. sectoral emission intensity as a proxy of 
pollution intensity. Despite the estimation problem due to the instrument selected as a proxy of 
pollution intensity, the result highlights that FDI are correlated to the environmental standards, 
although the effect is relative weak. The same result is provided by Keller and Levinson in 2002, 
they starting from the assumption that the largest exporters of polluting goods are not caused 
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by environmental policy alone but also by differences in economic activities. They conducted 
a panel analysis over the period 1977-1994 considering the foreign directed investment inflows 
in U.S. and measuring state pollution abatement costs from the PACE9 data, adjusted in order 
to consider each state's industrial composition. This allows to an estimation of PAC industry by 
industry evaluating compliance regulatory costs for each of industry considered. In this way 
they have build an index that compares the PAC adjusted for industrial composition in each 
state. The work provides a robust result underlining that pollution abatement costs have a 
significant but modest deterrent effect on the value and count of new foreign investment. A 
doubling of industry-adjusted index is associated with a less than 10% decrease in foreign direct 
investments (Keller and Levinson, 2002). Also, Chung (2014) analyzing FDI outflows to 50 
host countries in 121 industries over the period 2000–2007, in which South Korea introduced 
stronger environmental standards. The estimation considers a difference-in-difference strategy 
on intensive and extensive margin showing the presence of dirty flows productions to lax 
environmental policy countries. 
Hoffman et al. (2005) have given an important contribution to this strand of literature. They 
tested the Granger causality on pollution and FDI data introducing income differentiation 
among countries. The 112 countries, analyzed for the period 1971 to 1999, are classified in low, 
middle and high-income using the World Development indicators in order to account for the 
dimension of the economy. FDI are measured by the net inflows in US dollars, while the 
pollution is proxied by the CO2 emission, that is considered to be the primary greenhouse gas 
responsible for global warming; its regulation has been an important inter-governmental issue 
as in Talukdar and Meisner (2001). The result they showed is a very significant from our point 
of view. They found an important causality with respect to low-income countries that seems to 
be pollution havens, maybe because they do not have other characteristic to attract FDI, so lax 
environmental policy represents the only instrument at their disposal. This intuition is supported 
by the absence of a positive causality in the case of middle and high-income countries. 
In this context it seems to be necessary to consider how important is the dimension of the market 
within the strategic choices’ bundle that companies have at their disposal. This means to 
investigate not only on the difference between environmental regulation systems, but also on 
what happens when is the largest one (or the smaller one) that introduces the stringent 
                                                          
9 The Personal Assessment of the College Environment (PACE) is an innovative survey that allows institutions to 
easily assess their progress and highlight areas for growth, define areas needing change or improvement, and set 
the stage for more in-depth strategic planning. https://nilie.ncsu.edu/nilie/pace-survey/survey-instrument/ 
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regulation. In a theoretical model Sanna-Randaccio and Sestini (2012) showed that when the 
strongest measures are introduced by the largest country, and when the transport costs are high 
enough, then the probability that companies relocate via FDI is inversely proportional to the 
level of market asymmetry between the two markets. This result suggests that the environmental 
rules should consider the market size of countries involved. 
 
3.2 FDI between economic growth and environmental damage 
As the theory about the “halo effect” states in some cases the spillover effect of the FDI could 
be large enough to counterbalance, or even to outweigh, the effect of the environmental damage. 
3.2.1 FDI, CO2 emissions and energy intensity 
Talukdar and Meisner (2001) tried to give a proof about the positive effect of FDI, analyzing 
the relationship between CO2 emissions per capita, considered a proxy for the environment, 
with various institutional and structural dimensions such as the scope of financial market, 
industrial sector composition, and the level of FDI. The results show that the higher degree of 
private sector involvement in a developing economy, the lower is its environmental degradation. 
A well-functioning domestic capital market and the participation by developed economies in its 
private sector development further reduce environmental degradation. The negative value for 
FDI suggests that foreign direct investment in an economy is likely to have a positive impact 
on the environment supporting in this way the “halo effect”. Hence, this highlights the role of 
foreign direct investments as a driver for advanced and cleaner environmental technologies in 
developing countries. This opinion is confirmed also in the case of energy intensity, in fact 
Mielnika and Goldemberg (2002), analyzing 20 countries over the period 1970–1998, they tried 
to connect the energy intensity and FDI. The result seems to support the basic idea that the use 
of modern technologies diffused via FDI allow to a decline of energy intensity.   
At a different result arrives the contribution of Grimes and Kentor (2003), the analysis appears 
clear and quite simple. They used a panel regression over the period 1980-1995 in order to study 
connection between the increase of CO2 in less developed countries with respect the FDI flows. 
The empirical evidences show that foreign capital penetration in 1980 has a significant positive 
effect on growth in total CO2 emissions, finding in the same time no effect of domestic 
investment on CO2 emissions.  
In recent years Hakimi and Hamdi (2016) showed some evidences in favor of the negative role 
of FDI. Using a time series from 1971 to 2013, they investigated the possible impact of trade 
 16 
 
liberalization on environmental quality in Tunisia and Morocco. The study founded a 
bidirectional causality between FDI and emission of CO2, this means that the inflows to these 
countries is not clean and they regard environmentally harmful activities. The results of this 
paper appear very significant because, on one hand the study provides evidence about trade 
liberalization as a boost for the economic growth in both countries considered (positive 
relationship between trade and GDP), but on the other hand this growth seems to be harmful for 
the environment. The same results had already appeared in the case of India in 2009, when 
Acharyya conducted for this developed country a quite similar analysis over the period 1980-
2003. He found a statistically significant long run positive, but marginal, impact of FDI inflow 
on GDP growth. On the other hand, the long run growth impact of FDI inflow on CO2 emissions 
is quite large. So this not confirms the positive effect of  FDI but from all this strand of literature 
presented above appears quite clear the FDI “potential” role in achieving green growth goals 
(Lee, 2013). 
3.3 Location decisions: empirical results  
The branch of literature analyzed above suggests that, maybe, also the nature of investment 
might matter in this debate. Given a comparable data some studies focused the attention on 
industry location decision, looking at the problem from a more physical point of view 
considering what is the role of an environmental with respect the other national characteristics 
such as level of wages, taxation, unionization and so on. Studies on this topic started from the 
early ’80 years but in this survey, we decide to give a focus on more recently ones. In 2000 List 
and Co through a theoretical and empirical analysis found that the effect of environmental rules 
is small compared to other jurisdiction factors. In this setting it might be important to distinguish 
what happens in the case of developing countries, Mani, Pargal, and Huq (1996) used India as 
case study compering two level of regulatory stringency: the level of environmental spending 
and the enforcement. They found an insignificant effect played by enforcement while is positive 
the role of environmental spending, maybe because a high environmental spending means a 
country with durable an stable good governments. In the same year Levinson (1996) conducted 
an empirical work using PAC as a proxy of stringency, his analysis considered the new plants 
opening and not the closing ones for several reasons10. The result he found is positive, PAC 
                                                          
10 Levison (1996) argued that the most obvious reason is the firm decides to close and to move to another location 
only if the compliance costs to the normative are higher than the cost of the move. This means that the location 
decision for the oldest firms is insensitive to the small differences in regulation. 
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could influence the decision about new plants opening, but the standard deviation shows a very 
small effect.  
According to Brunnermeier and Levison (2004) all these studies suffer because, using cross-
sectional analysis, they ignore the importance of unobserved omitted variables. Henderson 
(1996) tried to consider this problem studying the role played by air quality regulation on the 
number of plants through a panel data analysis. The findings showed a pollution haven effect: 
maintaining other things equal, regulation appear as a deterrent for the new and oldest plants.  
3.4 The role of globalization 
Existing literature identifies international trade as a factor capable of influencing the EKC, 
according to which, after an initially period where development harms the environmental 
quality, the degradation declines as the income increases up to a threshold, beyond it further 
income growth would be a benefit for the environment.  
As explained above researchers appear divided about the way, positive or negative, in which 
trade can affect the environment. In particular this relationship seems to be contradictory, on 
one hand it could happen that pollution from polluted productions decrease in riches country 
and increase in the poorest one, as explained by the PHH, but on the other hand trade could 
improve the environmental conditions, because as income rises through trade, regulation 
becomes more stringent enhancing clean innovation and reducing pollution, this means that 
developing countries will automatically become cleaner as their economies grow (Harbaugh et 
al., 2001).  
Several empirical works tried to demonstrate the existence of inverse-U-shaped pollution-
income pattern. In 2005, Paudel et al. investigated the EKC on water pollution using US data 
and finding the threshold within the range $10241– $12993, $6636–$13877, and $6467–$12758 
for nitrogen, phosphorus, and dissolved oxygen, respectively. The existence of EKC is tasted 
by Harbaugh et al. in 2001 considering air pollution and income data in US. Other studies 
highlighted mixed results about the shape of the relation between pollution and income level 
(Beede and Wheeler, 1992; Hettige et al., 2000b). 
As suggested by literature (Martin and Wheeler, 1992; Reppelin-Hill, 1999), the diffusion of 
technologies in open markets foster the innovation of clean technologies even in developing 
countries, that, after the first stages in which pollution increases, could improve their 
environmental condition also by financing appropriate training, policy reforms, information 
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collection and public environmental education (Desgupta et al. 2002). In 2001, Wheeler argued 
that international competition could improve the environmental quality of poorest countries 
because it increases investments in new clean technologies and employment fostering in this 
way the environmental awareness. This means that globalization, increasing national income, 
seems to be a factor reducing pollution. Developing countries, exploiting “dirty” inflows 
investments from richest and developed countries, could rise their national income up to the 
turner point, beyond that environmental quality improves with the income growth (see Table 
2). 
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Authors Empirical study Results 
Eskeland and Harrison (1997) Empirical analysis that connected the U.S. pollution 
abatement cost to the FDI flows. 
They showed the absence of a significant 
effect in U.S. on both outbound and 
inbound FDI. 
Smarzynska and Wei (2001) The study considers inbound FDI in transition economies 
using the U.S. sectoral emission intensity as a proxy of 
pollution intensity 
The result highlights that FDI are 
discouraged by stringent environmental 
regulation. 
Keller and Levinson (2002) Panel analysis over the period 1977-1994 considering the 
foreign directed investment inflows in U.S. and measuring 
PAC as a proxy of pollution 
PAC have a significant but modest deterrent 
effect on the value and count of new foreign 
investment. 
Talukdar and Meisner (2001) The paper studies the correlation between CO2 emissions, 
structural variable and FDI   
The value for FDI appears negative 
suggesting a positive impact of FDI on the 
environment 
Hoffman et al. (2005) Granger causality on pollution and FDI data introducing 
income differentiation among countries. 112 countries over 
the period 1971-1999 
The evidence shows low-income countries 
seems to be pollution havens 
Hakimi and Hamdi (2016) Using a time series from 1971 to 2013, the work investigates 
the possible impact of trade liberalization on environmental 
quality in Tunisia and Morocco 
Bidirectional causality between FDI and 
emission of CO2, so the inflows is not 
clean. 
Chung (2014) FDI outflows from South Korea to 50 host 
countries in 121 industries over the period 2000–2007 using 
diff-in-diff estimation 
  
The estimation shows dirty flows 
productions to lax environmental policy 
countries. 
Table 2 – Summary of the literature 
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List and Co (2000) Through cross-sectional conditional logit analysis, analyses 
the location of foreign-owned manufacturing plant in U.S. 
considering regulatory expenditure and other country’s 
characteristics 
Coefficients are statistically significant, but 
the effect of environmental regulation is 
relatively small compared to the effect of 
other factors. 
Mani, Pargal, and Huq (1996) India case of study: compering of two level of regulatory 
stringency: environmental spending and enforcement 
There is an insignificant effect played by 
enforcement while is positive the role of 
environmental spending 
Levinson (1996) Empirical work using PAC as a proxy of stringency and new 
plants opening 
PAC could influence the decision of new 
plants opening but in a small way 
Henderson (1996) Panel analysis that connects air quality regulation and the 
number of plants 
Stringent regulation is a factor capable of 
influencing the number of plants 
Paudel et al. (2005) The work investigated the EKC on water pollution using US 
data using parametric and semiparametric models 
The evidence shows the presence of EKC 
and the threshold within the range $10241– 
$12993, $6636–$13877, and $6467–$12758 
for nitrogen, phosphorus, and dissolved 
oxygen, respectively. 
Mielnika and Goldemberg (2002) The study analyses the connection between energy intensity 
and FDI about 20 countries over the period 1970–1998  
The result shows a decline of energy 
intensity via FDI 
Grimes and Kentor (2003), Over the period 1980-1995 the study considers the growth of 
CO2 of 20 less developed countries and FDI 
FDI have an important effect on CO2 
growth 
Acharyya (2009) Effect of FDI on CO2 emission and on GDP over the period 
1980-2003 in India  
There is a statistically effect of FDI on GDP 
but this effect is smaller than the effect 
between FDI and CO2 emissions. 
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Harbaugh et al. (2002) The study considers the relationship between air pollution 
and income data in US 
There is little empirical support for an 
inverted-U-shaped relationship between 
several important air pollutants and national  
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4. The role of capital abundance 
If a branch of this literature explained in the previous sections argues the effect of trade 
liberalization necessarily leads to an effect of displacement of “dirty” goods and productions 
towards developing countries, another part of the theory states that probably this effect is 
mitigated or is almost absent thanks to the important role played by the capital abundance. 
Several works have demonstrated trade flows depend primarily on capital intensity and other 
inputs to production, rather than on differences in pollution abatement costs. This leads to high-
income nations (the developed countries) having a comparative advantage in many dirtier 
industries as their capital abundance more than offsets their higher regulatory costs (Baggs, 
2009). For instance, Tobey (1990) in his empirical analysis found that the stringent 
environmental regulations imposed on industries in the late 1960s and early 1970s by most 
industrialized countries have not measurably affected international trade patterns in the most 
polluting industries. Tobey (1990) applied Hecksher-Ohlin model for an empirical test on five 
of pollution-intensive industries, and in this case the distribution of “dirty” industries across 
countries was not changed, in this way the presence of a regulation has not affected the trade 
patterns. Similarly, three years later also Grossman and Krueger (1993) analyzed the trade 
patterns between US and Mexico examining the correlations with industry factor intensities, 
tariff rates and pollution abatement costs. Their results have demonstrated the factors 
influencing the trade patterns are the same recognized by the traditional literature, i.e. labor and 
capital intensity, while differences due to environmental regulation are very small. 
Perhaps, one of the most important contribution to this strand of literature is given by Antweiler, 
Copeland, and Taylor (2001) studied the effect of trade on the environment from both 
theoretical and empirical point of view. The effects of economic growth on trade can be broken 
down into three effects. “Technique” effects arise from the tendency toward cleaner production 
processes as wealth increases and trade expands access to better technologies and environmental 
“best practices.” “Composition” effects involve a shift in preferences toward cleaner goods. 
“Scale” effects refer to increased pollution due to expanded economic activity and greater 
consumption made possible by more wealth (Etsy, 2001). They evaluated the model through 
fixed effects analysis on sulfur dioxide (SO2) concentration over the period 1971-1996 in 40 
different countries. Combining composition, scale and technique effects11, they showed that the 
rise in trade could generate a decrease in SO2 concentrations. 
                                                          
11 In practise, technique and composition effect together outweigh the scale effect. 
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5. Conclusion and remarks 
This paper reviews a number of studies on international trade and environmental implications. 
The debate between these two topics continues to be fierce and heated, despite the vast research 
involved. Several studies agree on the negative role of international trade, which pushes “dirty” 
production and products towards countries with less stringent environmental regulations 
exacerbating their living conditions. On the other hand, there are many factors that identify 
international trade as a factor that can stimulate growth and improve environmental degradation. 
This literature shows that there are subtle and weak interactions between international trade and 
environmental policy which, especially in some aspects, seem to be lacking and unclear.  
The effect of international trade varies not only from country to country, but especially in 
relation to different environmental research fields. In this regard, we suggest an in-depth 
analysis of the consequences of international trade on the various pollutants. The analysis of the 
literature suggests that issues such as water pollution and waste still need to be debated in depth. 
Analysing the literature we have realised how far the consequences of the topics dealt with can 
give different results depending on the environmental fields in which they are studied. While 
the literature has focused on the one hand mainly on pollution factors affecting air quality (less 
on water quality), the presence of studies on the commercial flows of waste is marginal, 
although it has increased disproportionately in recent decades. The absence, or rather the 
scarcity, of studies on some subjects prevents a knowledge of the phenomenon as a whole and 
gives us an incomplete picture of the relationship that underlies environment and trade. 
From this perspective, it would seem clear that environmental degradation and its implications 
for international trade is currently a multi-faceted problem requiring combined actions. Global 
environmental measures affecting the issues of trade between countries require more scrutiny 
(Jayadevappa and Chhatre 2000), especially in relation to the consequences in terms of 
environmental damage.  
Further empirical works should be to categorize the consequences of international trade for 
different pollutants in different countries. Rather than trying to estimate the universal status of 
environmental damage, it would be useful to analyse what common features are shared by 
pollutants and countries where emissions are decreasing or increasing with trade, in order to 
draw more appreciate policy implications. 
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Drivers of international shipments of hazardous waste: the role of 
policy and technology endowment 
Abstract 
Using a gravity model for trade, this work analyzes the factors 
influencing the patterns of international hazardous waste flows. We 
carried out a country and regional empirical analysis relying on 
newly available data reported in the E-PRTR (European Pollutant 
Release and Transfer Registry) for EU-OECD countries over the 
period 2007 to 2014. Exploiting a consolidated empirical 
framework, we test two empirical hypotheses: firstly, we explicitly 
assess if, according to the pollution heaven hypothesis (PHH), the 
relative levels of environmental policies across countries are an 
important determinant of hazardous waste trade, and secondly, we 
test if technological specialization, proxied here by a technology-
specific patent stock, can be considered as a pull factor capable to 
influence the patterns of international trade of hazardous waste. 
 
1. Introduction 
In the last two decades, trade liberalisation and the increasing trend in consumption have led 
to a rapid upsurge in waste shipments across borders. More specifically, export of all wastes 
has raised from 6.3 million tonnes in 2001 to 18.8 million tonnes in 2014, while export of 
hazardous waste has increased by 55 % over the same period, with a  peak of 8.1 million of 
tonnes in 200712.  
Trading waste have obviously several relevant environmental and economic implications for 
both national and regional governments. If from the one hand, in fact, free trade could generate 
an equilibrium in which waste is treated were it is economically more convenient, from the 
one hand, there is the risks that shipments may results in an uncontrolled environmental 
dumping driven by differentials in environmental policy stringency. Consequently, 
                                                          
12 Source: Eurostat 
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understanding which factors shape waste flows across countries and regions, can shed a light 
on the mechanics of this complex phenomena and help to design more efficient policy tools.  
The economic literature highlights as there are two main mechanisms behind the relationship 
between trade and the environment. Firstly, Copeland and Taylor (1997), studies the effect of 
income and capital endowment differential on trade of dirty goods, and shows that if capital 
endowment represents the main difference between two countries, then the richest, with 
capital intensive production, becomes net exporter of dirty goods, and trade reduces world 
pollution. This will result in the emergence of pollution heaven. In contrast, if income 
differential between countries dominates, then trade may result in both the creation of 
pollution heaven and in an increase in world pollution.  
According to this framework, free trade reallocates dirty productions in poorest countries. 
Secondly, also the cross-country heterogeneity of environmental policies can play role in 
shaping international trade (Ederington and Minier, 2003; Chintrakarn and Millimet, 2006). 
The intuition behind this mechanism is that the introduction of a specific policy places an 
additional cost to domestic firms that could lead to a loss of international competitiveness. 
The regulation would thus induce firms to relocate pollution-intensive productions abroad or 
to import pollution-intensive goods from countries with lax environmental regulation, because 
the compliance with environmental standards requires radical solutions (in terms of clean 
product and process) that increase the marginal cost of production. This mechanism is 
generally known in literature as “Pollution Haven Hypothesis”. 
In the specific field of waste, there are only a few contributions studying the pattern of 
international trade. The early contribution of Baggs (2009) focuses on the role of countries 
capital abundance in shaping the trade of hazardous waste. This work start by the observation 
that capital intensive industries are the biggest producers of hazardous waste and tend to be 
localised in wealthiest countries with more stringent regulation. Therefore, high income 
countries generally have a comparative advantage in dirtiest industries (i.e. activities that 
generate large amounts of hazardous waste and activities aimed at disposing and recovering 
these hazardous waste). This capital abundance would predict that transboundary waste flows 
should go from lower income countries to higher income ones, so factor endowment could 
more than compensate the impact (opposite in sign) of environmental regulation. 
Nevertheless, this analysis, does not directly account for the role of environmental policies. 
More recently, Kellenberg (2012) shows that different intensity of environmental policies, 
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altering the relative marginal cost of abatement of national firms, is the main driver of 
municipal solid waste trade. In this work, however, the role of capital endowment is mostly 
overlooked.  
In the present article, we focused specifically on hazardous international waste flows. 
Hazardous waste is defined in Annex III of Directive 2008/98/EC. The difference between 
hazardous and non-hazardous waste is based on the system of classification and labelling of 
dangerous substances and preparations. In general, waste that poses threats to the environment 
and public healthy, in terms of toxicity, corrosivity, ignitability and reactivity, is defined 
hazardous. 
The choice of focusing on hazardous waste comes from different factors. Hazardous waste, 
requires more complex and advance disposal technologies with respect to non-hazardous, 
making them more suitable to test the role of capital abundance in shaping trade flows. 
Similarly, the sector is also highly regulated, allowing us to test for the presence of pollution 
heaven. In fact, the increasing amount of waste shipped attracted broad media attention, rising 
public awareness and placing more pressure on policy makers in this arena (Albers, 2015).  
This analysis expands the existing literature in several directions. Firstly, with respect to 
Baggs (2009), which analysis dates back to the period 1994-97, we exploit a richer and 
updated dataset. In particular, we employed the E-PRTR register (http://prtr.ec.europa.eu/), 
which allowed us to construct a panel dataset including bilateral hazardous waste flows at 
plant level for OECD-EU countries from 2007 to 2014.  
Secondly, thanks to this new rich set of information, we are able to complement the country 
level analysis with an investigation of transboundary hazardous waste flows among single 
firms, controlling for an host of factors at the NUTs 2 level. The value added of this second 
steps of analysis is manifold. On the one hand, it enriches the baseline specification testing 
for the role of some relevant regional characteristics like specialisation in waste treatment and 
openness to trade, while on the other hand it provides a robustness tests of our macro results 
adopting a different perspective.  
Thirdly, exploiting an ad hoc patent stock at firm level, we are able to account for capital 
abundance in a more reliable way with respect to Baggs (2009). More specifically, merging 
the E-PRTR register with patent data13 we are able to create waste specific index of capital 
                                                          
13 Data are taken from the European Patent Office. 
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endowments at both country level (for the country analysis) and plant level (for the regional 
analysis).  
Finally, we also test explicitly for the role of environmental policies, creating a variable 
capable to account directly for the effect of a difference in the level of environmental policy 
between two countries, and giving a precise test of the pollution haven hypothesis.  
The Paper is organised as follow Section 2 reviews the existing literature relevant to our topic. 
Section 3 introduces data and Section 4 gives descriptive evidences of the phenomena. Section 
5 presents empirical model and results while Section 6 is dedicated to the regional analysis. 
Section 7 concludes the paper.   
 
2. Context and conceptual framework  
Waste and their shipments are regulated by a complex mix of local, national and international 
policies. When it comes to the shipment of hazardous waste, the most important piece of 
legislation is the Basel Convention, according to which trade barriers seem to be necessary in 
order to prevent transfer of hazardous waste while minimizing the toxicity of waste generated. 
The Basel Convention was adopted by 184 countries and the European Union (Haiti and USA 
have signed but not ratified it) on 22 March 1989 and entered into force on 5 May 1992. His 
objective is to protect human health and the environment from the toxic effects of hazardous 
waste. In particular, the convention pursues: (1) the reduction of hazardous waste generation; 
(2) the restriction of transboundary movement; (3) a regulatory system for that cases where 
movements are permissible. The last one objective is based on the idea of prior information 
consent, it requires the track of every transaction.  
The European policy framework, however, seems to go in a different direction, and supports 
the principle that the disposal of hazardous waste in more technologically efficient countries 
can have a good effect on the environment. This represent, in a sense a change in the political 
paradigm. If the Basel convention, in fact, wanted to protect low/income country to became 
pollution heaven, in the EU the political guideline is that waste should be treated where the 
facility has the best recovery or recycling process. (European Commission, 2016). 
Nevertheless, waste policies are very heterogeneous across OECD countries, and these 
differences tend to be persistent across time (Nicolli, 2012). Obviously, this differential in 
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environmental policy stringency can influence significantly the relative abatement cost of two 
partner countries, and consequently facilitate the emergence of the so-called “Waste Haven 
Effect”. The mechanism in play is rather simple: being hazardous waste management a capital 
intensive activity, with large fixed and sunk cost, it is less likely, with respect to other sectors, 
that firms decide to offshore polluting activities in order to comply with environmental 
regulations (Ederington, Lenvinson and Miner 2004)14. Hence the central point of “waste 
shipment” is that for many countries the marginal cost of exporting waste is smaller than the 
cost of building new waste facilities at home or offshoring the production facilities that are 
responsible for the generation of waste. 
As a consequence, the first research hypothesis read as follow: 
H1: waste exports respond to increased stringency of environmental regulation. 
In order to test for this hypothesis, in this paper we constructed firstly an ad hoc policy index, 
and then we create a measure of the policy differential across every possible country pair.  
According to the contribution in Baggs (2009) transboundary waste flows could also be the 
results of a country specialization. His intuition is rather simple. Since the contribution of 
Antweiler et el. (2001), economic literature suggests that comparative advantage in dirty 
industries generally derive from capital abundance, which often drives trade more than 
pollution abatement costs (Krueger, 1993). This mechanism, imply that often, in high-income 
countries, the effect of comparative advantage in dirty production on trade, more than offset 
the role plays by higher regulatory costs, or the so-called pollution heaven hypothesis. Being 
the disposal of hazardous waste a capital intense activity, it is reasonable to assume that 
differential in capital endowment can act as an attractive factor for waste trade. A simple 
descriptive exercise, presented in Figure 1, gives preliminary support to Baggs’s theoretical 
predictions. The figure shows the amount (in tonnes) of hazardous waste exported and 
imported by OECD EU countries over the period 2007-2014. As visible, Germany is the 
biggest net importer of hazardous waste despite being a country with a stringent set of 
environmental policies. According to this logic, the reason behind this result can be found in 
its high level of capital abundance.  
                                                          
14 See also Cole and Elliot (2005) and Cole and Okubo (2010) 
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As a consequence, one can argue that a country specialisation in the disposal of dirty goods, 
being a direct consequence of an high capital abundance, is a factor which can attract shipment 
of hazardous waste. Consequently, the second research hypothesis can be read as follow: 
H2: Transboundary waste flows are the result of a country (region) specialisation in waste 
treatment technologies. 
 
Figure 1-Total import and export of waste by country 
 
 
2. Data and descriptive statistics 
Panel data on transboundary hazardous waste flows are obtained from the E-PRTR database 
(European Pollutant Release and Transfer Registry) for EU countries over the period 2007 to 
2014. 
Introduced by Regulation (EC) 166/2006, the E-PRTR is the European-wide register that 
collects environmental data for about 30.000 industrial facilities and covers 65 sectors. For 
what concerns hazardous waste, E-PRTR includes information on international waste 
shipment of hazardous waste for those facilities that transfer off-site (either in the home 
country or abroad) 2 tonnes or more of hazardous waste per year. 
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To measure the relative stringency of waste-related environmental policies, we build a specific 
policy indicator. The policy index is the result of a two-step process representing respectively: 
(1) the systemization and weighting of the different types of government policies to manage 
waste, and (2) their joint adoption per country per year. The indicator is based on the “OECD 
database on Policy Instruments for the Environment”. 15 On the basis of this information, we 
create a series of ordinal variables ranging from 0 to 2 and representing the policies adopted 
in the field of waste management. Specifically, the variable takes the value of 0 when the 
policy has not been adopted, 1 when the policy stringency is below the yearly median level, 
and 2 when it is above the median. After the creation of this indicator variable, we standardize 
the policy index by averaging all the policies adopted per country per year (hence, we 
averaged all the ordinal variables adopted per country per year). Table 1 summarizes 
descriptive statistics and data sources. 
As a proxy for country specialisation in hazardous waste, we use a stock of knowledge 
measured by a patent stock. We retrieved information on patent applications at the European 
Patent Office in two different IPC classes that are related to the management of hazardous 
waste. These are: 
• A62B 29/00 " Devices, e.g. installations, for rendering harmless or for keeping off 
harmful chemical agents"; 
• A62D 3/00 " Processes for making harmful chemical substances harmless, or less 
harmful, by effecting a chemical change in the substances". 
EPO patent applications were assigned to the country of the applicant and the stock was built 
by means of the perpetual inventory methods (with depreciation 0.15). Moreover, to account 
for the general level of technology of countries, we also compute the total stock of EPO 
patents (depreciation rate 0.15). 
Data about gravity variables (distance, contiguity, common language between partner and 
reporter) are taken from CEPII database16. These variables are considered as the specific 
determinants of bilateral trade flows between country pairs. 
                                                          
15 Data are available here: http://www2.oecd.org/ecoinst/queries/. As these data only refer to countries 
that belong to the OECD, our sample only considers EU countries that also belong to the OECD. 
16 http://www.cepii.fr/cepii/en/bdd_modele/bdd.asp 
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Other covariates of our empirical analysis include: 
• Total GDP, retrieved from the World Bank Development Indicator database; 
• Population density, retrieved from the World Bank Development Indicator database; 
• Installed capacity (in MW) of plants that recover energy from industrial waste, as a 
proxy of installed capacity of treatment plants, retrieved from Eurostat. 
We began the analysis from the first year of application of the registry (2007) to 2014. The 
sample contains information about every region transaction outside the home country of 
hazardous waste in EU countries that also belong to the OECD.  
Table 1-Descriptive statistics and data sources 
 
  Mean Stand. Dev. Min Max Sources 
Dependent Variables    
  
Export of HW waste 6792.894 44169.73 0 981537 E-PRTR  
 
     
Count of transaction 5.727976 27.75168 0 444 E-PRTR 
 
     
Total export (value) 6.05e+09 1.32e+10 486398 1.32e+11 UN Comtrade 
 
     
Total export (weight) 3.64e+07 1.06e+08 500 1.77e+09 UN Comtrade 
 
     
Independent Variables      
Gradient Population density 0 .9147465 -1.845704 1.845704 World Bank  
 
     
Gradient Total patent stock (t-1) 
0 1.587695 -2 
2 European Patent 
Office 
 
     
Gradient Patent stock in 
technologies for  
0 1.629107 -2 
2 European Patent 
Office 
treatment of hazardous waste (t-1)      
Gradient policy stringency 0 1.149387 -2 2 OECD 
 
     
Gradient MW capacity of energy 
recovery 
0 1.684172 -2 
2 Eurostat 
from hazardous waste      
Gradient GDP 0 .6961583 -1.628009 1.628009 World Bank 
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log(distance) 6.956285 .6925747 4.087945 8.120583 Cepii 
      
Contiguity .1333333 .3399852 0 1 Cepii 
Common language .0238095 .152478 0 1 Cepii 
 
     
 
4. Descriptive evidence 
Figure 2 reports trends in the quantity of hazardous waste shipped as well as the trend in the 
number of transactions as reported in the E-PRTR. Between 2 million and 4 million of 
tonnes of hazardous waste were shipped every year in our selection of countries, with a fast 
growing trend. These shipments occur in about 2000-2500 transactions per year.  
As visible in Figure 3, the ten most important bilateral flows over the whole period 
(accounting for 66 per cent of total shipments in our sample) are the export of waste from 
Italy to Germany and the export of waste from the Netherlands to Germany. This means that 
Germany represents the destination of the most important part of the whole European 
hazardous waste, suggesting the leadership of the Germany in this field. Figure 4, on the 
contrary, shows as the there is a correlation between the amount of waste produced by plants 
and their export propensity, although this relationship is not linear.17  
Finally, in Figure 5 we report the patent stock at end of our period for selected technologies 
related to the management of hazardous waste, and compare it with the total patent stock. 
France emerges as the technological leader in terms of patents in the field of recovery and 
disposal of hazardous waste, followed by Germany and Italy. Interestingly, we observe that 
the ranking of countries when considering our selection of technologies does not overlap 
with the ranking for total patents, suggesting a pattern of specialization of certain countries 
in these technologies.  
 
 
 
                                                          
17 The dots in figure represent the average value of shipment in each percentile of the shipment distribution. 
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Figure 2-Trend in hazardous waste shipments 
 
 
Figure 3-Relationship between total HW generation (percentile) and export propensity (share of 
exported Hw on total Hw) 
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Figure 4-  Most important bilateral flows 
 
 
Figure 5-Stock of patent (2014) in relevant hazardous waste management technologies and 
total patent stock 
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5. Empirical model and results: Country analysis 
We employ a gravity model to evaluate the drivers of shipment of hazardous waste across EU 
countries. The first theoretical explanation of a gravity model is given by Anderson (1979) 
and, ten years later, by Bergstrand (1989). They demonstrated that a gravity equation can be 
derived as a reduced form of many models of international trade. The gravity equation is a 
specification relating to nominal bilateral trade flows from exporter i to importer j. It is derived 
theoretically as a reduced form from a general equilibrium model of international trade in final 
goods. Exporter and importer GDPs can be interpreted in these models as the production and 
absorption capacities of the exporting and importing countries, respectively. Bilateral distance 
between the two countries is generally associated with transportation costs. We enrich this 
basic specification by accounting for the importance of drivers that are specific to the trade in 
hazardous waste. These variables relate to differences in regulatory stringency in the waste 
realm and differences in the technological endowment in the field of managing hazardous 
waste. 
Following Kellenberg (2012), we express our variables in gradients using the midpoint 
formula. Specifically, these gradients follow this structure:  
Eij=(Ei-Ej)/((Ei+Ej)/2) (1) 
where i and j represent the origin and destination country, respectively. Values larger than 
zero indicate that the origin country has a relatively larger value of the destination country. 
The advantage of this approach is having a comparison measure between two countries. For 
example, the gradient of patent stock represents the average percentage change in patent stock 
between importing and exporting country. If the destination country does not possess the 
essential technology to treat waste with respect to a potential exporter, then the gradient will 
be negative. The same is for the policy gradient, negative value implies that importing country 
has more stringent regulation. As visible from Table 1 in the Section above, the value of 
gradient variables in mean is equal to 0, because our gravity model is symmetric, so each pair 
and its reverse are cancelled. For the same reason the minimum and the maximum value are 
equal but with opposite sign. We estimate the following model: 
WFijt=β1GDPijt+β2PSijt+β3WPSijt+β4ESijt+β5Dij+β6Lij+β7Cij+ δit+μjt+εijt (2) 
where: 
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• WFijt is the export of hazardous waste between country pairs (in tonnes); 
• GDPijt is the gradient of the GDP between country pairs; 
• PSijt is the gradient of the total patent stock; 
• WPSijt is the gradient of the waste-specific patent stock; 
• ESijt is the gradient of our indicator of environmental policy stringency; 
• Dij is the distance (in logarithm) between centroids of countries; 
• Lij is a dummy that is equal to one if both countries share a common language; 
• Cij is a dummy for common border between the two countries; 
• δit and μjt are year-specific dummies for, respectively, reporter and partner countries. 
In line with the recent literature, the model is estimated by means of the Pseudo Poisson Maximum 
Likelihood estimator (PPML) proposed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) to accommodate for the 
large share of zeros in gravity models. In fact, the transactions equal to zero in our dataset amount to 
2.461 compared to 1.067 non-zero. 
Table 2-Baseline results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Export of 
hazardous 
waste 
Export of 
hazardous 
waste 
Count of 
transactions 
Export of 
hazardous 
waste 
Total export 
(value) 
Total export 
(weight) 
Contiguity 0.178 0.191 0.534* 0.324 0.473*** 1.044*** 
 
(0.280) (0.298) (0.275) (0.298) (0.0765) (0.122) 
log(distance) -1.463*** -1.483*** -1.610*** -1.444*** -0.503*** -0.778*** 
 
(0.286) (0.278) (0.248) (0.265) (0.0552) (0.0752) 
Common language 1.356*** 1.298*** 0.833*** 1.143*** 0.755*** 0.581*** 
 
(0.245) (0.228) (0.224) (0.235) (0.108) (0.146) 
Gradient GDP -0.326 -0.354 0.0692 -0.347 0.122 -0.0666 
 
(0.377) (0.357) (0.291) (0.360) (0.201) (0.168) 
Gradient Population density -0.928 -0.636 1.409* -0.610 0.214 0.832** 
 
(0.842) (0.846) (0.821) (0.857) (0.269) (0.352) 
Gradient Total patent stock (t-1) -0.644*** -0.580** 0.168 -0.596** 0.0528 0.00736 
 
(0.217) (0.234) (0.202) (0.234) (0.0718) (0.0811) 
Gradient Patent stock in technologies for  -0.353** -0.503** -0.540*** -0.500** 0.00315 0.0302 
treatment of hazardous waste (t-1) (0.166) (0.236) (0.170) (0.226) (0.0531) (0.0692) 
Gradient policy stringency 0.672** 0.794* 0.770** 0.580 0.143 -0.0133 
 
(0.334) (0.449) (0.381) (0.456) (0.245) (0.212) 
Gradient MW capacity of energy recovery 
from hazardous waste 
   -0.280* 
(0.147) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Model PPML PPML PPML PPML PPML PPML 
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Year dummies Yes No No No Yes Yes 
Origin country dummies Yes No No No Yes Yes 
Destination country dummies Yes No No No No No 
Year-specific origin country dummies No Yes Yes Yes No No 
Year-specific destination country dummies No Yes Yes Yes No No 
N 3360 2867 2867 2867 3360 3360 
Standard errors clustered by reporter-partner pair in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Sample: AT, BE, CZ, DE, DK, 
EE, ES, FI, FR, GB, GR, HU, IE, IT, LU, NL, PL, PT, SE, SI and SK for 2007-2014.  
 
Results reported in Table 2 provide confirmation to our hypothesis. In columns 1, 2 and 4 we 
evaluate the amount of shipments of hazardous waste (in weight) of bilateral shipments of 
hazardous waste while in columns 3 we consider the count of bilateral transactions between 
two countries. As a robustness check, we also evaluate total trade in value and weight (column 
5 and 6, respectively) as a benchmark. Our expectation is that our waste-specific variables 
(mainly the waste-specific patent stock and the policy stringency indicator) have no influence 
on overall trade but only on trade of hazardous waste (Kellenberg, 2012).  
With the only exception of column 1, where only origin, destination and year dummies are 
included, we include origin-year and destination-year dummies in all other regressions. Our 
first variable of interest, that is the (gradient of) proxy of stringency of waste-related 
regulation, features a generally positive and significant impact (columns 1, 2 and 3) on the 
quantity of hazardous waste that is shipped abroad. An increase of 10 percent in the relative 
stringency of waste-related environmental regulation in the origin country with respect to a 
potential destination country results in an increase in the export of hazardous waste (from 
origin to destination) of about 6.7-7.9 percent.  
The gradient of the patent stock in technologies related to the management of hazardous waste 
has a negative impact on export of hazardous waste. If the origin country is particularly well 
endowed of appropriate technologies to deal with hazardous waste relative to a potential 
destination country, a lower amount of hazardous waste will be shipped to that destination 
country. A country's technological specialization is a factor influencing the patterns of 
international waste trade (see Baggs, 2009). It should be noted that this result is conditional 
on the overall differences in technologies across countries, that is accounted for by including 
the gradient of the total patent stock. This variable also has a negative impact on the export of 
waste. This suggests that the variable indicates the role of technological level between 
countries in general, and not only for the technologies about hazardous waste.  
As a robustness check, in columns 4 we also include another proxy variable for the domestic 
availability of specific facilities to manage hazardous waste, that is gradient of installed 
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capacity (in MW) of facilities for energy recovery of hazardous waste. This variable gives us 
information about the actual level of facilities in terms of efficiency in disposal/recycling 
waste. This variable turns out to be negatively related to the export of hazardous waste: if the 
destination country is relatively well endowed with of energy recovery facilities for hazardous 
waste (i.e. high gradient), producers in the country of origin will export hazardous waste to 
be used in these facilities abroad. 
Results for total export (columns 5 and 6) suggest no influence of either policy stringency or 
waste-specific patent stock on trade patterns. This means that these variables do not pick up 
other unobserved factors that drive trade in general, but are specific to trade in waste. 
Looking at our control variables, geography-related variables influence trade in the expected 
way, with distance being negatively related to waste shipments and presence of a common 
language showing a positive impact on trade. What is interesting here is that the elasticity of 
hazardous waste export with respect to distance is -1.5, much larger than the one estimated in 
gravity equations that look at total trade of standard commodities, that is estimated to be for 
the same sample of countries and period about -0.5 for the value of trade and -0.78 for the 
weight of trade (see columns 5 and 6 of Table 1). This result is not a surprise since the waste 
transport is very expensive compared to other standard commodities. Contiguity only matters 
for the extensive margin, that is the count of transaction and the probability of observing at 
least one transaction. 
Relative differences in the size of the economy (total GDP) and in population density do not 
play any significant role in explaining the export of hazardous waste. Countries with relatively 
larger production of non-hazardous waste tend to export less hazardous waste while countries 
with larger production and domestic management of hazardous waste tend to export more. 
An important concern regards the issue of endogeneity. Environmental policies can be 
influenced by firms. The biggest firms, playing an important role in their sector or even in the 
economy as a whole, could encourage policy makers to undertake particular environmental 
choices (Downing and White, 1986). Furthermore, if the environmental stringency (or 
absence thereof) is considered as a form of protection for industry, the import flows may be 
an important factor in environmental policy strategies. Similarly, the endogenous problem 
comes when we consider the technological variable. Successful technologies at time t-1, 
associated with positive import performances, could be a driver for future investments in 
research and development at time t in the same technologies. In this way the current patent 
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stock could be influenced by the one of the past period. As Kellemberg (2012) argued, the use 
of environmental gradient can relax the issue related to the policy, in fact each country cannot 
introduce different environmental standards associated to each of countries partner. 
Furthermore, since the implementation of a specific treatment is not able to account for this 
question because of the absence of a counterfactual period, the use of year-specific origin and 
destination country dummies is a way to reduce these endogeneity concerns. 
 
6. Regional analysis: data and results 
Preserving the same literature and empirical context, we exploit the microdata provided by 
E-PRTR about origin and destination waste facilities. We consider the volume of hazardous 
waste shipped at NUTs 2 level between regions of OECD EU countries over the period 2007 
to 2014. More specifically, in this case we study hazardous waste flows across plants, 
controlling for the role of some regional factors. 
Figure 6- Volume of hazardous waste in OECD EU destination regions 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7- Relationship between number of exporting regions and total export of HW by 
plant 
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Table 3- Number of region associated to each exporting plant 
Average 2.97 
Median: 1 region 
Maximum: 45 regions 
50.7% only export to one region 
68.4% to 1 or 2 regions 
78.6% to 1, 2 or 3 regions 
 
Figure 5 shows the investigated area and gives us an idea about the volume of hazardous waste 
exported in the destination regions. This is consistent with our expectation because most of 
volume of waste treated is concentrated in the central Europe, and in general in most 
developed EU countries18. Similarly, Table 3 above shows some light on the shipment 
structure. More specifically, it shows as, on average, every region exports to other three 
destination regions with a percentage of 78.6. Furthermore, exporting plants account for 
                                                          
18 This is the case of Scandinavia, Germany, France and United Kingdom. 
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11.2% of total plants that generate hazardous waste, representing as much as 32.6% of total 
HW generation (either managed at home or exported) and these plants generate, on average, 
3.9 times more hazardous waste than non-exporting plants. The average distance per tonne of 
waste shipped is around 496.5 Km (median 373.9 Km) while average distance per number of 
transactions is 649.1 Km (median 545.6). 
Using the same estimated model discussed in the section 5,19 we introduce some elements 
novelty. In particular as visible from Table 4, it can be argued that regional specialisation can 
influence waste flows. It is likely, in fact, that plants ship waste to destination plants or regions 
which are specialised in the specific type of waste that they produce. 
 
Table 4- Waste sectors 
Nace Description Number of 
exporting 
plants(share 
of tot) 
Export of 
HW(share 
of tot) 
Average 
export 
of 
HWper 
plant 
Average 
number of 
destination 
NUTS2 
per plant 
01 Crop and 
animal 
production, 
hunting and 
related service 
activities 
1.4% 0.0017% 37 1 
05 Mining of coal 
and lignite 
0.1% 0.0000% 7 3 
06 Extraction of 
crude 
petroleum and 
natural gas 
0.1% 0.0001% 44 1 
07 Mining of 
metal ores 
0.4% 0.0147% 1005 10.8 
08 Other mining 
and quarrying 
2.2% 0.0066% 90 2.2 
09 Mining 
support service 
activities 
0.1% 0.0017% 717 2 
10 Manufacture 
of food 
products 
5.0% 0.2358% 1422 2.1 
11 Manufacture 
of beverages 
0.6% 0.0331% 1698 6.8 
13 Manufacture 
of textiles 
0.3% 0.0013% 128 1.5 
15 Manufacture 
of leather and 
related 
products 
0.1% 0.0555% 22772 2 
16 Manufacture 
of wood and of 
products of 
wood and cork 
0.5% 0.0078% 457 5.6 
17 Manufacture 
of paper and 
paper products 
1.7% 0.0095% 169 2.1 
                                                          
19 In this case i and j denote not countries but the region of export and the region of import, respectively.  
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18 Printing and 
reproduction 
of recorded 
media 
0.5% 0.0154% 903 1.7 
19 Manufacture 
of coke and 
refined 
petroleum 
products 
2.4% 1.6361% 20327 2.9 
20 Manufacture 
of chemicals 
and chemical 
products 
16.4% 2.9937% 5554 2.1 
21 Manufacture 
of basic 
pharmaceutical 
products 
4.9% 7.0916% 44054 8.2 
22 Manufacture 
of rubber and 
plastic 
products 
1.7% 0.0599% 1068 2.7 
23 Manufacture 
of other non-
metallic 
mineral 
products 
3.8% 1.3085% 10520 3 
24 Manufacture 
of basic metals 
11.1% 4.2583% 11639 1.8 
25 Manufacture 
of fabricated 
metal products 
11.0% 8.9035% 24500 1.5 
26 Manufacture 
of computer, 
electronic and 
optical 
products 
1.4% 0.2325% 5016 3.5 
27 Manufacture 
of electrical 
equipment 
1.5% 0.0540% 1107 2.5 
28 Manufacture 
of machinery 
and equipment 
n.e.c. 
1.0% 0.0224% 707 2.1 
29 Manufacture 
of motor 
vehicles, 
trailers and 
semi-trailers 
2.4% 0.0776% 964 1.9 
30 Manufacture 
of other 
transport 
equipment 
1.2% 0.0361% 924 1.3 
31 Manufacture 
of furniture 
0.1% 0.0013% 257 1.5 
32 Other 
manufacturing 
0.6% 0.2315% 11864 4.5 
33 Repair and 
installation of 
machinery and 
equipment 
0.5% 0.0055% 323 4.1 
35 Electricity, 
gas, steam and 
air 
conditioning 
supply 
4.4% 0.3834% 2664 3.3 
37 Sewerage 1.0% 0.1722% 5433 0.9 
38 Waste 
collection, 
treatment and 
disposal 
activities; 
materials 
recovery 
19.1% 68.2927% 108430 3.6 
39 Remediation 
activities and 
0.3% 0.8490% 87018 2 
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other waste 
management 
services 
42 Civil 
engineering 
0.1% 0.0260% 5330 1 
43 Specialised 
construction 
activities 
0.1% 0.4144% 84951 1.5 
46 Wholesale 
trade, except 
of motor 
vehicles and 
motorcycles 
1.0% 0.0889% 2603 1.4 
49 Land transport 
and transport 
via pipelines 
0.2% 1.0015% 136876 4.3 
52 Warehousing 
and support 
activities for 
transportation 
0.3% 0.1597% 16369 1.5 
72 Scientific 
research and 
development 
0.1% 0.0001% 11 1.5 
84 Public 
administration 
and defence; 
compulsory 
social security 
0.1% 0.2203% 90310 7 
  Total 100.0% 100.0% 30041 2.8 
 
As a consequence, we built a specialization index for each destination region like a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the destination region is specialized in the treatment or disposal of 
imported waste from the same activity sector of the exporting plant, and 0 otherwise. In fact, 
specialization Sd in destination regions is the ratio between: 
Sd= EXPtotal/ EXPactivity 
where EXPtotal is the sum of total export by destination region and EXPactivity is the sum of 
export by destination region sorted by activity. The variable is considered with a threshold of 
20 percent, thus the variable takes value 1 if this ratio is greater than 0.2. 
Similarly, we also control for the propensity to trade of different regions. The 
“internationalization index” is the simple gradient between the amount of hazardous waste 
exported in origin and destination regions, and it appears significant and with negative sign. 
In particular, the construction follows the gradient explained above: 
Int= (EXPorigin – Expdestination)/((EXPorigin + Expdestination)/2) 
 
Finally, we also control for the total amount of hazardous waste generated in the home region. 
Results are presented in Table 5. In order to make easier the discussion, the column 2 of Table 
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5 represents the regional gravity model with the same specification of the macro one (results 
reported in column 1), with the introduction of origin, destination and year dummies variable 
in both cases. Results seems to provide confirmation of our expectation also in the regional 
case, with only exception of the gradient of total patent stock, in this case is not significant. 
This result suggests that if the country’s region has a particular technological advantage to 
deal with hazardous waste, a greater amount is shipped, despite the overall technological level.  
Furthermore, the regional model shows the importance of having a common border between 
regions, and underlines the role of distance. As in the previous model the distance is (negative) 
significant, so a greater distance between regions reveals a lower amount of waste flow. In 
the column 3 we control for the volume of hazardous waste treated domestically and we 
include proxy variables about regional specialization and internationalization.  
An important role seems to be played by the specialization, because it reveals that, higher 
specialization in the treatment of particular categories of hazardous waste in the region, 
involves a greater amount of waste imported. This result is particularly relevant if we consider 
that in this specification the patents are not significant, therefore the presence of patents 
related to waste realm in general is important, but it is overtaken by being specialized in the 
disposal of a given category of waste treatment. 
As expected, also the internalization index and the amount of hazardous waste produced in 
the home region shows a statistically significant coefficient associated with the expected sign. 
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Table 5- Baseline results 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  
Export of 
hazardous 
waste 
Export of 
hazardous 
waste 
regional (1) 
Export of 
hazardous 
waste  
regional (2) 
Contiguity 0.178 1.374*** 1.269*** 
 
(0.280) (0.185) (0.182) 
log(distance) -1.463*** -1.152*** -1.089*** 
 
(0.286) (0.0915) (0.0748) 
Common language 1.356*** -0.0949 -0.152 
 
(0.245) (0.354) (0.367) 
Gradient GDP -0.326 0.528** 0.383 
 
(0.377) (0.251) (0.253) 
Gradient Population density -0.928 -0.0160 1.0755 
 
(0.842) (0.151) (0.156) 
Gradient Total patent stock (t-1) -0.644*** 0.0389 0.0174 
 
(0.217) (0.0503) (0.0586) 
Gradient Patent stock in technologies for  -0.353** -0.0453*** -0.0115 
treatment of hazardous waste (t-1) (0.166) (0.0427) (0.0548) 
Gradient policy stringency 0.672** 0.630*** 0.861*** 
 
(0.334) (0.239) (0.282) 
Total of HW generated and managed    0.256*** 
in home country   (0.0345) 
Gradient internationalization    -0.0851*** 
 
  (0.0276) 
Specialization in destination region    2.873*** 
   (0.244) 
    
Model PPML PPML PPML 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Origin country dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Destination country dummies Yes Yes Yes 
N 3360 1387411 1387411 
 
7. Conclusions and remarks 
The aim of this paper is to consider the different drivers of international hazardous waste 
flows, in particular the relative levels of environmental policies, and technological 
specialization across countries and regions.  
In line with previous literature, the presence of environmental policy shows a positive 
influence on the direction of hazardous waste shipments, confirming the role of more stringent 
regulation as a factor influencing the pattern of international trade. On the other hand, we find 
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that also country specialization in treatments of hazardous waste matters. In fact, empirical 
evidences underline that countries with greater innovative technologies have a significant 
ability to deal with hazardous waste treatments (both recovery and disposal). As visible the 
results are confirmed at two different levels of analysis. Regional analysis conducted on 
regions at NUTs 2 level provides a confirmation and, introducing some elements of novelty, 
strengthens the results achieved through the country analysis. 
However, we tried to mitigate the question of endogeneity using gradient variables and 
introducing dummies variables making the model as strong as possible, but we know that 
further researches are needed in order to assess the influence of endogeneity.  
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How inequality and institutional setting impact on eco-
innovation? 
 
                   Abstract 
This work tries to analyse the factors influencing the development 
of new eco-friendly innovations. We focused our attention on the 
role played by income distribution and government institutions, 
capable to foster the development of new technologies. Richest 
classes encourage the production of new technology through the 
demand of green goods. Furthermore, the presence of democratic 
and liberal societies brings good governance and builds states’ 
capacity to promote economic and social development. Using 
environmental related patents as a good indicator of eco-
innovation, we employed a count regression model combining 
these aspects in order to find the causal effect on generating eco-
innovation.
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1. Introduction 
The development of new technologies represents an important issue especially in the 
environmental field. A growing body of literature analyses the generation of eco-
innovations from different point of view, in particular the role of regulation capable of two 
main effect. On one hand regulation may induce a specialization process in eco-friendly 
goods or technologies, and on the other hand the possibility to relocate dirty production 
abroad, in particular in the poorest countries. In this context the literature underlines a large 
cross-variation among rich countries in environmental policy stringency and in the aptitude 
to develop green innovations. This allows to make way for uncertainty about the Kuznets 
curve hypothesis (Grossman and Kruger, 1995), according to which, above a given levels 
of income, economic growth leads to a significant reduction of emissions per capita levels. 
For this reason, seminal studies showed that this relationship holds in the case of local 
pollutants (Dinda, 2004)20. 
Furthermore, inequality within countries also impacts on the capacity of investing in green 
technologies. According to the literature (Beise and Rennings, 2005) different levels of 
income have two main contrasting effects. The first one is related to the economic growth 
cycle, that does not satisfy the necessity to generate appropriate environmental policy 
instruments and eco-innovation (Magnani, 2000). The second one concerns the 
consumption of eco-friendly product, that increases with income level. Therefore, it happens 
that high income inequality within country rises the demand of green goods (Heerink et al. 
2001).  
Seminal theoretical and empirical works argued that North-South income and institutional 
differences across countries can oppose to the reduction of the general level of 
environmental degradation (Chichilnisky, 1994; Chichilnisky and Heal, 1994). In this view 
a particular role seems to be played by the institutional context among countries.  
Democracies tend to be a driving force capable of influencing and facilitating scientific and 
technological innovation, but on the other hand non-democratic systems have a strong 
leadership able to foster innovation and technical improvements. Following a philosophy 
point of view  liberal societies have a positive effect on innovation21, as a result economic 
                                                          
20 See also e.g. Harbaugh et al., 2004; Stern, 2004.  
21 This is the so-called Popper Hypothesis. See Popper (2005,2012). 
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literature underlines the possible link between democratic institutions and innovation 
performance (Salahodjaev, 2015), whereas Kuhn (2012) argued that institutional factors 
represent only a secondary aspect in the innovation process. 
The purpose of this paper is to combine these two aspects. We want to extend the analysis 
on the relationship between income inequality and development of new green technology 
introducing the institutional setting. Using a count regression model this work tries to test 
the Popper Hypothesis and the role of income by examining the relative influence of these 
two aspects on the volume of environmental related patents.  
The rest of the work is organized as follow. Section 2 connects the literature about inequality 
and institution framework to the environmental innovation. Section 3 presents data and 
empirical model. Section 4 is devoted to empirical results and possible extensions whereas 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature and framework 
Innovation represents one of the most important driver of economic growth becoming 
increasingly especially in the last decades. Many studies underline the link between 
innovation and growth not only in developed countries, but also in developing ones that, 
through imitating process, foster domestic innovation (Zanello et. al, 2015). In this context 
a particular role is played by the social condition of each country in terms of political system 
of governments and income inequality.  
According to the literature on democracy, recent works support the spillover effect of a 
democratic system that boosts social and economic development. Several studies suggested 
democratization like the primary objective in every developing country (Kohli, 1993; 
Leftwich, 1993) able to encourage innovation through the realization of focused 
developmental policies (Bottazzi and Peri, 2003; Nelson, 1993). Despite this branch of 
literature, some studies cast doubt on the positive impact of democracy on innovation 
conditioning this link on a combination of developmental background (Almond and Verba, 
2015). In some sense they neglect the Popper Hypothesis giving to the democracy a 
marginal role. In a recent work Gao et al. (2017) tried to demonstrated the causality nexus 
between innovation performance and political structure studying the effect of some 
representative institutional variables on the number of inventions and patents considered a 
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good indicator of technological development. In the paper they found no statistical 
significant evidence in favor of a democracy’s effect on innovation, embracing the literature 
that neglect the Popper hypothesis.  
H1: Democratic institutions influence the development of green technologies. 
In order to study the link between democracy and innovation we test this hypothesis in the 
case of eco-innovation stressing its importance especially in the case of developing 
countries.  
Another body of literature focused the attention on the relationship between inequality and 
technology development. Tselios (2011) showed that the existence of a richest social classes 
is essential to stimulate innovation activities.   
This is especially relevant in the case of eco-innovation. Pioneer consumers have higher 
capacity to purchase green products more expensive than dirtiest ones, hence they trigger 
innovations. As a consequence, the price reduction allows also poorest consumers to buy 
this kind of products (Vona and Patriarca, 2011). Several studies showed that richest 
consumers have a greater environmental consciousness because of their higher education 
level, in this way the demand of green products rises. 
H2: An unequal income distribution represents a stimulus to eco-innovation. 
There are most relevant reasons to think that a great part of eco-friendly innovations arises 
from the demand of these new goods. First of all, as Murphy et al. (1989) showed, demand 
fosters the innovations characterized by high fixed cost, and this is the specific case of 
environmental innovation that require consistent investments. 
This view is opposed because even in democratic societies the power decision is not equally 
distributed across individuals, but it reflects the income distribution. If the richest 
individuals are those who takes advantage from environmental degradation, more equal 
societies (where the power/income is more equal distributed) conduct to higher level of 
environmental protection (Boyce, 1994). Vona and Patriarca (2011) showed, thanks to 
empirical and theoretical arguments that, especially for richest countries, a more equal 
distribution of income induces the development of green goods and production processes. 
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3. Data and empirical model 
 
3.1 Patents Application 
 
Recent literature has exhibited great interest in studying technological innovation and the 
identification of good indicators has always represented a very relevant topic although there 
are very few instruments available. Many studies considered research and development 
expenditure like a good approximation of innovation (Magnani, 2000;), but in such a way 
R&D expenditure is an imperfect indicator of innovation performance since it represents 
only an input of research and development activities (Jonsthon et al., 2010). 
Focusing on the outputs of innovation performance (i.e. the production of new technologies 
and new products), patents provide many useful information about invention and applicant. 
According to Griliches (1990) the use of patents is the best practice to debate about 
innovation topics, besides patents (sorted by year) are correlated to R&D expenditure, so 
they contain inside also information about the inputs of innovative activities.   
In order to study the impact of political institutions and income distribution on eco-
innovation, we retrieved information about patenting in environmental related technologies 
from two different sources. The first one is The Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) that 
consents a strong protection in every contracting state by applying a single international 
patent application. The second one is the European Patent Office that offers patent’s 
protection in 32 European member states. The EPO application is more expensive with 
respect a single application in national patent offices, for this reason EPO data ore most 
relevant because the higher price represents a sort of quality barrier eliminating low value 
applications (Johnston et al., 2010). It is important to emphasize that we consider the 
inventor’s country that makes the application to EPO or PCT register. This is why we can 
consider countries that are not protected by either the EPO register or the PCT register. 
Our analysis covers a long span of time and a large number of countries; in particular we 
build a panel dataset with 40 countries from 1990 to 2013 and it considers all OECD 
countries plus 5 developing countries22. Figure 1 reports trends in EPO and PCT patent 
applications (in mean) in environmental related technologies during the whole period.  As 
                                                          
22 BRICS countries, i.e. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. 
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visible the development of eco-friendly technologies shows a strong growth in the last years 
of the period considered. Moreover, the average number of EPO patents is lower than PCTs. 
 
Figure 8- Trends in EPO and PCT patent applications 
 
 
The introduction of BRICS countries is particularly relevant in our analysis because it 
provides additional information especially in the case of environmental issues. Figure 2 
reports the trend of patents application in BRICS countries in the period covered and it 
reflects the situation above, in fact also in developing countries the share of environmental 
patents is increased especially in 2012, in fact after a peak in 2012  they began to decrease 
in 2013.   
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Figure 9- Trend EPO and PCT patents application BRICS countries 
 
 
In particular Figure 3 shows that China23 registers the leadership in environmental related 
innovation for both EPO and PCT applications, while Russia and India exhibit a quite 
similar share for both patents application. It is relevant to underline that the number of PCT 
applications is greater than the EPO ones in all cases with South Africa exception, probably 
this difference is due to the large number of PCT contracting countries and to the highest 
quality of EPOs. 
 
                                                          
23  Values in mean considering the whole period covered.  
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Figure 10- Trends in EPO and PCT patent applications in BRICS countries 
 
 
3.2 Explanatory variables 
The aim of this work is to study the drivers of eco-innovation considering how the 
institutional setting and the distribution of income can affect the production of new 
technologies to decrease the level of environmental degradation as a whole. Table 1 
summarizes the main statistics related to explanatory variables.  
In order to account for income inequality, we considered in all specifications the Gini index. 
It is based on disposable income to account for differences across countries in fiscal policies 
and welfare regimes. The information about Gini are collected from The Standardized 
World Income Inequality Database (SWIID), that reflects the Gini coefficient at each 
percentile on the population which means that the Gini coefficient is given at lowest 1 
percentile until top 100th percentile. In order to obtain a single Gini value per country per 
year we calculated the average of all the hundred Gini coefficients in the dataset.  
We considered in the set of explanatory variables the GDP per capita per country per year, 
this information is taken from OECD.Stat database. Moreover, we decided to introduce the 
education level. The underlining idea of this choice is a positive correlation between years 
of study and the demand for low environmental impact products. For these reasons, the 
expectation is a positive effect of the education level on eco-innovation. We retrieved the 
information about educational level from the OECD.Stat. 
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Data about institutional systems are taken from different sources. Several indicators are used 
like a measure of the level of democracy of countries. We use the data of Polity2 index that 
are taken from Polity IV Project (Marshall et al., 2014). The Polity2 index takes values 
ranking from -10, when in the country there is a full autarchic political system, to 10 that 
corresponds full democracy. 
 
Table 6- Descriptive statistics and data sources. 
  
Obs Mean Stand. Dev. Max Min Fonte  
GDP per capita 942 23856.42 13950.53 0 95352.29 OECD 
 
      
Gini  956 32.34921 8.795913 0 59.65902 SWIID 
 
      
Educ 597 27.09859 12.93387 4.757609 75.18226 OECD 
 
      
Polity2 925 8.736216 2.9793 -7 10 Polity IV Project 
 
      
Gov 946 40.36469 28.01064 1 83 World Bank 
       
 
3.3 Model specification 
In order to test the hypothesis set out in the Section 2 above, we present the following model: 
PAT𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1GINI𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2GDP𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3EDUC𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4POLITYit + 𝛽5TOTAL Pat𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6GOV𝑖𝑡
+  𝛼𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where i= 1, … ,40 indexes the cross-sectional unit (country) and t= 1990, …, 2013 indexes 
time. The dependent variable is measured by the number of patents in environmental related 
technologies and it is transformed as to assume integer values. The explanatory variables 
include: 
• GINIit is the Gini index per country per year; 
• GDPit is the per capita GDP per country per year: 
• EDUCit is the level of population that have reached a tertiary education level per 
country per year; 
• POLITYit is POLITY2 index; 
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• GOVit is the time length for which a country has had durable governments 
institutions; 
• 𝛼𝑖 are the fixed effect introduced to capture unobservable heterogeneity; 
• 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term that captures all the residual variation. 
We used a negative binomial model in order to estimate our model. Count data models, such 
as the Poisson and negative binomial distribution, have been suggested for estimating the 
number of occurrences of an event (Wooldrige, 2002). In our case the number of patent 
applications at EPO and PCT represent a count variable because it is a realization of non-
negative integer value. To this aim we supposed that the number of patents follows a negative 
binomial distribution. Moreover, we tried to estimate the model with a robust Poisson 
regression that is identical to a simple Poisson regression but with a robust estimate of the 
variance-covariance matrix. 
 
4. Empirical results 
Several alternative specifications of the model were estimated and Table 2 summarizes 
principle results. We repeated all specifications for both PCT and EPO patents in order to 
account for differences about the quality of inventions. Columns 1 and 2 provide results 
about the influence of income distribution on patent application. We confirm the positive 
role of GDP per capita, in fact the dimension of the economy has a great impact on the 
development of eco-innovations. Instead Gini index presents a positive e significant value, 
this result supports the pioneer consumers theory. In fact, the presence of the presence of an 
unequal distribution of income could lead to an increasing demand of green good that trigger 
the innovation reducing prices. Furthermore, this result provides a partial confirmation of 
our expectation about the role of education level. There is a positive and significant rule of 
education only in the case of PCT patents, this means that more educated population has a 
push effect in developing new green technologies. 
Last two columns show the results of the full specification introducing institutional variables. 
As visible we can confirm the results provide in the first specification about GDP, Gini index 
and level of education. Focusing on the institutional setting we can prove the same results 
providing by Gao et al. (2017). It seems to be no effect of democracy institutions on eco- 
innovation. Although in column 4 the variable Polity2 is positive, it is not significant, while 
in the column 3 the variable Gov appears significant and with positive sign. This variable 
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takes into account the government length and the hypothesis that a durable government can 
foster the generation of innovation through stable environmental policies and public 
investments. There is no doubt that policies and investments aimed at stimulating innovations 
require very long implementation time, this is the reason why this variable appears significant 
and with expected sign.  As is visible, the number of observation decrease across estimations, 
in non-linear models the fixed effects are conditioned out of the likelihood which is then 
maximized. The main point regarding is that conditional likelihood estimators can only use 
observations for which the outcome varies. If there is only one observation in the group, then 
there is no within variation with uninformative result.  
 
 
Table 7- Baseline results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pat_PCT Pat_EPO Pat_PCT Pat_EPO 
     
     
GDP per capita (log) 1.669*** 1.597*** 1.558*** 1.456*** 
 (0.120) (0.113) (0.134) (0.137) 
Gini 0.009*** 0.008** 0.010*** 0.008** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Educ 0.029*** 0.008 0.022*** 0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Polity2   -0.050 0.014 
   (0.040) (0.039) 
Gov   0.009** 0.007 
   (0.004) (0.004) 
Total PCT .0000172 ***  .0000161 ***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  
Total EPO  .0000167 ***  .0000155 *** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
     
     
     
Observations 594 594 582 582 
Log likelihood -2268.563 -2235.640 -2252.023 -2215.562 
Prob>Chi2 0 0 0 0 
     
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8- Baseline results no BRICS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pat PCT Pat EPO Pat PCT Pat EPO 
     
GDP per capita (log) 1.669*** 1.602*** 1.558*** 1.461*** 
 (0.121) (0.113) (0.135) (0.137) 
Gini 0.009*** 0.007** 0.009*** 0.008** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Educ 0.029*** 0.008 0.022*** 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Polity2   -0.046 0.015 
   (0.041) (0.040) 
Gov   0.009** 0.007 
   (0.004) (0.004) 
Total_PCT .0000172 ***  .000016 ***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  
Total_EPO  .0000166 ***  .0000155 *** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
     
Observations 581 581 569 569 
Log likelihood -2227.7163 -2202.9183 -2211.2834 -2182.863 
Prob>Chi2 0 0 0 0 
     
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample without BRICS countries 
 
We tried to estimate our model eliminating BRICS countries. The results are reported in the 
Table 3. The structure of the model is the same of the previous one. Despite the absence of 
BRICS countries, that represents a great part of eco-innovation activity in the last years, the 
results hold with respect the full dataset.  
We can confirm the role of GDP and the positive effect of Gini index, the same is for the 
tertiary level of education. It would seem that the size of the economy is one of the factors 
determining the development of new technologies, combined with the presence of a large 
gap in income distribution. It would appear that the increase in GDP leads to an increased 
demand for green technologies. This seems consistent with the literature, with the growth 
of the economy environmental degradation decreases. Institutional variables are not 
significant except the one about the length of government and this result is very relevant for 
our analysis. Brics countries present very particularly governments, for example China has 
the leadership in innovative technologies with high growth rates, but in the same time the 
power is exercised by the only Chinese Communist Party. In general, the government 
structure of Brics countries is distant of being liberal with respect OECD countries present 
in our dataset.  
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4.1 Robustness Check 
As a robustness check, we tried to estimate the model using a fixed effect Poisson model 
with robust standard errors, that according to Wooldrige (1999) tends to be more reliable, 
although it is unlikely to be efficient. 
Table 9- Poisson model with robust standard errors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pat PCT Pat EPO Pat PCT Pat EPO 
     
GDP per capita (log) 1.556*** 0.970*** 1.111** 1.008** 
 (0.327) (0.340) (0.539) (0.459) 
Gini 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
Educ 0.048*** 0.041*** 0.041* 0.041*** 
 (0.018) (0.013) (0.022) (0.016) 
Polity2   0.119 0.091 
   (0.124) (0.126) 
Gov   0.022 -0.001 
   (0.024) (0.018) 
Total PCT 0.0000162  0.0000145  
 (0.0000103)  (0.00000950)  
Total EPO  0.0000129  0.0000129 
  (0.0000161)  (0.0000164) 
     
Observations 594 594 582 582 
Log likelihood -4859.8602 -3860.3859 -4797.3265 -3828.4585 
Prob>Chi2 0 0 0 0 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
The first set of estimations reported in Table 4 confirmed our hypothesis and previous 
results. GDP per capita has a positive and significant effect on both applications, the same 
is for the Gini Index and for the role played by education level, that appears significant in 
every specifications meaning the strong impact have the educational level as driver of eco-
innovation. In these specifications the count of total patents seems to be significant, unlike 
what happened before. Looking at institutional setting we find interesting results in this 
specification. As visible, democratic institutions seem to have no role in fostering green 
patents. To this aim our results seem to embrace the literature that rejects Popper's 
hypothesis discussed above. It is only the income distribution that has an effect and these 
empirical results appear to confirm our expectation in H2. The relationship between 
inequalities and green innovation appears very strong in every specification suggesting the 
proactive role of inequality in fostering green innovation. 
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In order to check the role played by Brics countries, we estimate the same model without 
them as above. Results are reported in Table 5. This estimation confirmed the previous 
results. Despite the absence of developing countries we can confirm hypothesis two and 
neglect the first one. 
Table 5- Poisson model with robust standard errors no Brics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
 Pat PCT Pat EPO Pat PCT Pat EPO 
     
GDP per capita (log) 1.559*** 0.972*** 1.114** 1.009** 
 (0.328) (0.341) (0.540) (0.459) 
Gini 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
Educ 0.047*** 0.041*** 0.041* 0.041*** 
 (0.018) (0.013) (0.022) (0.016) 
Polity2   0.119 0.091 
   (0.124) (0.126) 
Gov   0.022 -0.001 
   (0.024) (0.018) 
Total PCT .0000161  .0000144  
 (.0000103)  (9.50e-06)  
Total EPO  .0000129  .0000128 
  (.0000161)  (.0000164) 
     
Observations 581 581 569 569 
Log likelihood -4817.081 -3822.0645 -4754.677 -3790.141 
Prob>Chi2 0 0 0 0 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample without BRICS countries 
 
 
5. Conclusions and remarks 
In this research we investigated the causal effect that income distribution and institutional 
system have on the generation of eco-friendly innovations. Our analysis shows a significant 
role of fabric of society. High income social classes usually present high education level 
and therefore a stronger environmental awareness that drives them to ask for more expensive 
green goods. Hence, thanks to an imitating process, clean goods become more accessible 
even for less well-off social classes. In this way rich class, pushing the demand, fosters eco-
innovation.  
Furthermore, the results seem to neglect Popper Hypothesis. In the first specification the 
length of government exhibits a relevant effect, but this variable itself is not a sign of 
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democracy or not. This would only demonstrate that the innovative process requires stability 
despite the form of government. 
Second specification confirm our results. However, this does not mean that there is clear 
evidence. The Polity2 index, which measures the degree of democracy of a society, while 
being positive (more democracy and more innovation), never becomes significant. 
Governments in autocratic countries decide to invest more resources in science and 
technology research to increase their power (as is the case of Russia and China). On the 
other hand, democratic countries are much more open in every aspect. Even if they are not 
at the cutting edge of innovation, democratic countries can more easily receive technology 
transfers from countries with similar regimes (Allison, 2002). Democratic countries can 
import advanced technologies from abroad rather than prioritizing domestic innovation. 
This appears an efficient path to economic growth in the age of globalization24.  
  
                                                          
24 For a complete literature about trade liberalization and environment see the first essay of this work. 
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